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Abstract:  
This paper revisits Buzan’s (2004) book From International to World Society, in the light of both 
the seven papers in this special issue, and the English School literature on world society written 
since then. The paper focuses on two themes. First, it addresses the different meanings in the 
usage of ‘world society’. It distills these down into three forms: normative, political and 
integrated world society, and shows how these relate to, and extend, the earlier taxonomy of 
 2 
interhuman, transnational and interstate domains. Second, it pushes forward on the question of 
how we might understand the concept of primary institutions in relations to world society. I show 
how some, but not all, of the primary institutions of interstate society have deep roots in world 
society. I then propose that the key primary institution for normative world society is collective 
identity, and for political world society, advocacy. 
 
Keywords: English School, collective identity, interstate society, non-state actors, primary 
institutions, world society. 
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Introduction 
 
In this concluding paper, I am not going to review the other contributions as such, but step back 
and consider their implications for how the still neglected topic of world society within the 
English School (ES) might be studied.
1
 In doing this, I try to push forward the logic of the 
positions and definitions developed in Buzan’s 2004 book, while taking into account some of the 
other discussions of world society published since then. Williams (2014: 127) describes that 
book (Buzan, 2004) as ‘arguably providing the first effort at a comprehensive treatment’ of 
world society, so it seems a reasonable place to start. The aim in what follows is twofold: first, to 
consider to what extent the arguments from 2004 still stand, or are in need of revision or 
abandonment in the light of subsequent discussion; and second, to try to extend the argument 
into areas where both the earlier work, and subsequent ES writings, have left things vague or 
unfinished.  
 
In what follows I take up two issues: first, the several meanings of world society and how they 
might be clarified and related to each other; and second, the still largely unaddressed question of 
how to relate the concept of primary institutions to world society. I defend the distinctions 
among interhuman, transnational and interstate domains as still providing a useful way to think 
about world society, but I develop further how they relate to the various meanings of world 
society in play in the literature. Earlier work, raises the question of how one might think about 
primary institutions for world society, but did not attempt to answer it. Here I venture some 
possible answers, and explore their consequences. 
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Three Meanings of World Society 
 
As Stivachtis and McKeil (this volume) note in their introduction, the ongoing vagueness and 
uncertainty in the meaning of world society is a problem for the ES. The ES’s central concept of 
a society of states, although much more powerful and nuanced than ‘international system’, does 
not by itself seem adequate to encompass a more globalized world order. To capture the more 
complex processes of global governance, the ES needs to bring world society more into play, 
both by clarifying its meanings and by deepening and widening its accounts of how world 
society and the society of states interact. There are three main meanings of world society in play, 
both in these papers and in the wider literature. It is worth focusing on these in more detail, and 
in the process considering Stivachtis and McKeil’s suggestion that perhaps making a 
terminological distinction among them might be useful. I will call them normative world society, 
political world society, and integrated world society. The first two of these provide most of the 
analytical leverage in connecting world society and interstate society. The third is mainly a label 
to describe the merger of world and interstate society. My approach here is mainly 
sociological/empirical: i.e. I am assuming that these things have empirical reality and display 
inside/outside relationalism. I am aware that one could also take a discursive approach to all this, 
but I leave that to others better equipped than me to do so. 
 
Normative World Society 
 
Normative world society reflects both Bull’s ‘great society of humankind’, and Buzan’s (2004: 
118-59) idea of ‘interhuman societies’ mainly expressed in patterns of shared identity. As 
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Linsenmaier (this volume) argues, the ‘great society of humankind’ view of world society is 
profoundly normative. Williams (2014: 132) likewise observes how world society in ES usage 
has become linked to a solidarist ‘moral cosmopolitanism’. In this meaning, humankind is seen 
as comprised by individuals, and is distinct from states and the society of states. The main 
emphasis in ES usage is on the universal, cosmopolitan, normative foundations provided by 
using the interests and wellbeing of humankind as a whole, as a referent object against which to 
judge the society of states. This meaning contains no necessary or expected degree of any actual 
organization, or even general consciousness, of social structure. It can, indeed, take an entirely 
philosophical form, as in natural law and divine law, where the truth or not of the idea is the 
main concern.
2
 It stands as a moral counterpoint to the interstate society, and because it has no 
actor quality in itself, is dependent on interstate society to provide some degree of order and 
justice, and to keep a balance between those two aims.  
 
McKeil (this volume) is correct to argue that making an empirical reality of normative world 
society sets an extremely high bar. Yet only if normative world society actually came to have an 
empirical expression would it seriously challenge the society of states in the fundamental way 
implied by those who place cosmopolitanism in opposition to interstate society (for discussion, 
see Buzan, 2014: 89-96, 119-22). Such a development is highly unlikely in the foreseeable 
future, and in essence, normative world society in a global sense does not require any empirical 
expression other than the existence of humankind. Humankind can be used as an ethical and 
moral referent regardless of whether it has any organizational expression or even any universal 
self-consciousness. Pella (2013: 72-4) shows how mobilising the universal, cosmopolitan, 
sentiment was crucial for the anti-slavery movement in the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries. Most of 
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Clark’s (2007) case studies of the influence of world society on the society of states are very 
much within this universal moral conception of world society. And Weinert (this volume), makes 
the same universal case about the common heritage of (hu)mankind. Weinert argues nicely that 
those who speak in the name of world society or universal values must be aiming to ‘cognize and 
construct a world’.  
 
Weinert’s argument, and also Pella’s (2013) and Navari’s (this volume), all raise the question of 
whether the normative conception of world society requires that things done in its name 
necessarily be framed at the global level. Is this true, or just a consequence of the happenstance 
use of the word ‘world’? The usage ‘international’ or ‘interstate’ society does not generate the 
question of ‘universal or not?’. International/interstate society can be global, but it can also be 
regional or subglobal without creating any conceptual difficulty. Why should not the same be 
true of ‘world society’ regardless of the universal implications of ‘world’? As usages such as ‘the 
Islamic world’ or ‘the Chinese world order’ suggest, ‘worlds’ have only to be reasonably self-
contained and distinctive, not necessarily planetary in scale. Normative world society in its 
universal sense hangs on the identity of being human and the ethical standing attached to that. It 
might or might not be attached to a general consciousness of being a member of humankind, but 
it only requires that some people think in this way in order to mobilise this identity, as for 
example in the anti-slavery campaign (Clark, 2007: 37-60; Pella, 2013). 
 
But human identities come in many forms that are less than universal, yet still have ethical 
standing attached to them. These forms necessarily have observable empirical reality in the form 
of collective identities that differentiate subsets of humankind from each other and from the 
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whole. They range from large scale identity formations such as religions and civilizations; to 
identities that are transnational, or even just within states. The key is that such identities are 
neither part of states, nor dependent on states for their reproduction. Nationalism sits at an 
awkward interface between world society and the society of states. Sometimes it might best be 
seen bringing world society into the framework of the society of states (nation-states). But it can 
also be seen as separate from and in tension with the society of states, as in the case of Pan-
Arabism and Pan-Russianism on the macro-scale; and national identities either running across 
state borders (e.g. Korean, Bengali), or embedded within states on the micro-scale (e.g. Welsh, 
Ibo, Zulu, Tibetan). This kind of world society is mainly pluralist (Williams, 2005). Aside from 
the thin global consciousness of being humankind, its normative content is fragmented into 
numerous divided parts, from civilizations and religions, to nations, tribes and clans. Language 
groups are also an important marker. The normative quality of this fragmentation is expressed in 
pluralism, and the understanding that a diverse cultural legacy is history’s gift to humankind, and 
is worth preserving for the same reasons that biological diversity is worth preserving. 
 
In this view, the normative content of world society is fragmented and multiple, rather than 
singular and universal. Both Linsenmaier (this volume) with his case study of the interplay 
between the subglobal world society identity of ‘European’ and interstate society in Europe, and 
Stivachtis (this volume) with his study of the Philhellenic movement, are very much within this 
view. Within this understanding of world society, it is possible to subdivide ‘the great society of 
humankind’ into smaller, but still large, identities. In this way, a path can be found around 
McKeil’s high universal hurdle. Civilizations or religions might well be empirically more 
realisable on subglobal scales where a strong sense of ‘we’ is a historical legacy. Stroikos’s (this 
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volume) space international society, and Costa-Buranelli’s (this volume) Central Asian identity, 
are also both operating within this fragmented conception of the non-state world society. 
 
Normative world society can therefore come in parts as well as the whole. In either case, it is 
separate from the structures of the society of states. Because of this divisibility, when using the 
label of normative world society, it is necessary to specify whether one is referring to humankind 
as a whole or some subset thereof, as the moral referent. If humankind as a whole is the 
normative referent, then the value is likely to be cosmopolitanism and human rights, a pattern 
observable in much of the solidarist ES literature (Buzan, 2014: 123-33). If some subset of 
humankind is the referent object, then the values in play can come in infinite variety, from the 
lebensraum project of the Nazis for the German people, to the rights of smaller/weaker identity 
groups to preserve their cultures and languages against being overridden by bigger/stronger ones. 
 
Political World Society  
 
Like normative world society, political world society must be significantly separate from the 
society of states. It comprises all the non-state social structures visible within humankind as a 
whole that have both significantly autonomous actor quality, and the capacity and interest to 
engage with the society of states to influence its normative values and institutions.
3
 As both 
Clark (2007), and Pella (2013) emphasise, world society in this sense is about the political 
engagement of non-state actors with the society of states. This engagement is not necessarily or 
even usually in the form of an antagonistic zero-sum game. As Clark (2007: 1-35) rightly points 
out, world society and the society of states might both gain legitimacy and status from their 
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interaction. Indeed, their interaction needs to be understood, because without taking it into 
account, it is not possible to understand how the society of states works. So while normative 
world society is about identity structures within humankind, political world society is about a 
certain type of non-state actor. 
 
On this basis, one can see that Pella’s (2013) critique of Buzan’s  (2004) model of three domains 
(interhuman, transnational, interstate) is partly valid but partly wrong. Pella is correct to argue 
that in the real world it is impossible to separate the actions of individuals from those of non-
state actors, a point also validated by Clark’s (2007) case studies. But he is wrong to claim that 
this shows the practical inseparability of the interhuman and transnational domains. Interhuman 
society is defined by collective identities on various scales – it is identity that validates the idea 
of society in this domain. Individual humans engaging with interstate society have non-state 
actor-quality, and therefore count as part of political world society. The ES literature is replete 
with confusion and ambiguity on this point, and it is a very easy mistake to make. Williams 
(2014: 127), for example, talks about world society as adding non-state actors to interstate 
society, and offering ‘a perspective focused on individual human beings and the idea of a global 
human community’. What he means is that it is individuals, rather than states, that form, or are 
the members of, world society, a classical sociological position that society is composed of 
individuals. This is different from individuals being actors. Buzan was certainly not clear enough 
on this point either. 
 
The key to connecting normative and political world society does not lie along the line suggested 
by Pella, of merging individuals from interhuman society and non-state actors from transnational 
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society. Instead the link is that normative (interhuman) world society provides the ideational 
resources with which political (transnational) world society engages interstate society. As just 
argued, it can do this either on the basis of humankind as a whole or subsets of humankind. As 
Williams (2014:130-31) hints, non-state actors are, in effect, the intermediaries between 
normative world society and interstate society. Looking at the relationship amongst the three 
domains in this way opens up a range of interesting questions about what gets selected to be 
transmitted from world to interstate society, and why it gets selected? And what determines the 
outcomes: power? Cultural fit? Contingencies of timing? Stivachtis’s (this volume) study of the 
Philhellenic movement is precisely about this linkage between an ideational resource in 
normative world society being mobilised by political actors. Costa-Buranelli (this volume) 
rightly reminds us that this relationship between world and interstate society is a two-way street. 
The identities and actors from world society can be foundational in providing the shared 
culture/identity underpinning interstate society. But interstate society can also repress world 
society, as in his Central Asia case, and also in the Arab World, where identities transcending 
states can be used to undermine the state-system by providing a higher level of authority to be 
captured by charismatic leaders. 
 
Notwithstanding the criticism of his argument by Stivachtis and McKeil (this volume), by my 
argument Pella (2013: 74-7) is thus mainly right in his larger argument that ideology is ‘the 
fundamental point of departure’ for (political) world society. The actors in political world society 
draw on the ideational/ideological resources of normative world society to make their case. 
Those resources range from humankind as a whole, through religion and civilization, and 
explicitly political ideologies such as liberalism, socialism, racism and fascism; to various 
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national and subnational identities. They also include more functional ideas such as sport, that 
need to organize themselves within, but separately from, the society of states.  
 
Integrated World Society 
 
The first two meanings of world society are based on separating the interstate domain from both 
the interhuman/normative one, which serves as its normative reservoir, and the 
transnational/political one, which serves as the activist lobby intermediating between normative 
world society and interstate society. Integrated world society brings all three domains under one 
umbrella, creating an ideal-type for a prospective future. This meaning is an aggregating concept, 
representing the idea that the social structure of humankind can best be understood by linking all 
three domains together. It is what global governance, with its emphasis on the intermingling of 
states, intergovernmental organizations, non-state actors, and people, points towards as an 
eventual outcome of an ever-more densely integrated and interdependent human society on a 
global scale (Acharya, 2016; Karns & Mingst, 2010; Rosenau, 1992; Weiss, 2013; Zacher and 
Sutton, 1996).  
 
Integrated world society is partly an abstract, ideal-type model, and partly a predictive teleology 
based on observed trends in global governance. It is also partly a normative approach, aiming to 
place human rights, and the rights of non-state organizations, perhaps particularly transnational 
corporations, on a par with state’s rights, and so to roll back the idea that state sovereignty 
constitutes the over-riding foundation of order in the affairs of humankind. Buzan (2004: 203) 
characterises all this as follows:  
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A world society in my sense would be based on principles of functional differentiation 
amongst the various types of entities in play, and agreements about the rights and 
responsibilities of different types of unit in relation both to each other and to different 
types. States and firms, for example, would have to accept the historical evidence that 
neither performs efficiently when it tries to do the other’s job, and that their respective 
legal rights and obligations need to be clearly demarcated. Each type of unit would be 
acknowledged by the others as holding legal and political status independently, not as a 
gift from either of the others. Individuals and firms would thus become subjects of 
international law in their own right. 
 
In this conception, the present model of international society, which privileges states over all 
types of entity, is basically hierarchical. While sovereignty might make states legally equal to 
each other, it makes them superior to both people and non-state actors of all kinds (Buzan and 
Schouenborg, forthcoming). Integrated world society would abandon this privileging of states in 
favour of a more functional formulation in which the various kinds of actors in play – whether 
states, TNCs, non-state actors, or individuals – would each carry intrinsic rights and 
responsibilities, with none in a general superordinate position over the others. Integrated world 
society would also largely remove the tension between cosmopolitanism and interstate society by 
facilitating state-centric solidarism. An integrated world society would provide an easier path for 
the realisation of the normative pressures from ‘the great society of humankind’ to operate 
through interstate and indeed transnational society. World society in this sense would involve a 
revolutionary re-basing of the principles of legitimacy that currently differentiate 
normative/interhuman and political/transnational world society from interstate society. 
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In some ways, integrated world society is the least interesting, or perhaps the least analytically 
useful, of the three meanings of world society. It has no historical referents, and enthusiasm for 
global governance and global civil society notwithstanding, it does not look as if the basic 
hierarchy privileging the state is going to disappear any time soon. Integrated world society 
remain useful as an aspiration, and perhaps also as a framing for thinking about how uncivil 
society actors such as mafias and terrorists, might be handled within that kind of social structure. 
But the main practical interest of world society resides in its normative and political meanings. 
These have deep historical roots, and for the foreseeable future they define the main dynamics 
necessary to understand the global and local interplay of interstate and world society. 
 
World Society and Institutions 
 
Both Stivachtis and McKeil, and Navari (this volume) raise the question of how the concept of 
primary institutions relates to world society. Little advance has been made towards answering 
this question since Buzan (2004: 118-38) raised it, and neither did he include it in the active ES 
debates in his 2014 book. Davies (2017) has, however, recently made an interesting preliminary 
foray on the topic in which he argues that world society is in many ways analogous to the society 
of states in terms of its primary institutions. Otherwise, the ES has mainly confined itself to 
thinking about the structure of international society in state-centric terms. Clark (2007), and 
various discussions of human rights (Donnelly, 1998; Wheeler, 2000), have acknowledged that 
the institutional structure of the society of states can be, and sometimes is, shaped by upward 
pressure from world society. Yet to the extent that world society is analogous to interstate 
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society, we cannot fully define it unless we know what its institutions are. On that basis, a 
reasonable place to start thinking about this is the definitions of primary and secondary 
institutions given in Buzan (2014: 16-17): 
Primary institutions are those talked about by the English School and reflect the second 
usage of ‘institution’ above. They are deep and relatively durable social practices in the sense 
of being evolved more than designed.
4
 These practices must not only be shared amongst the 
members of international society, but also be seen amongst them as legitimate behaviour. 
Primary institutions are thus about the shared identity of the members of international 
society. They are constitutive of both states and international society in that they define not 
only the basic character of states but also their patterns of legitimate behaviour in relation to 
each other, and the criteria for membership of international society. The classical 
‘Westphalian’ set includes sovereignty, territoriality, the balance of power, war, diplomacy, 
international law and great power management, to which could be added nationalism, human 
equality and more recently and controversially, the market. But primary institutions can be 
found across history wherever states have formed an international society.  
Secondary institutions are those talked about in regime theory and by liberal institutionalists, 
and relate to the organizational usage of the term. They are the products of a certain types of 
international society (most obviously liberal, but possibly other types as well), and are for the 
most part intergovernmental arrangements consciously designed by states to serve specific 
functional purposes. They include the United Nations, the World Bank, the World Trade 
Organization and the Nuclear Non-proliferation regime. Secondary institutions are a 
relatively recent invention, first appearing as part of industrial modernity in the later decades 
of the 19
th
 century. 
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From this starting point, we can think along two lines: first, how might these definitions apply to 
identifying the institutional structure of world society in itself; and second, what is the interplay 
between the institutional structures of interstate and world society? 
 
The Institutional Structure of World Society in Itself 
 
We can start this process by looking at the first two meanings of world society established in the 
previous section: normative and political. Both of these meanings define world society in terms 
that make it necessarily distinct from interstate society and thus require that there be identifiable 
institutions of world society in itself. The definitions of these two meanings give strong pointers 
to where one should look for the relevant institutions. In the case of normative world society, 
institutions must relate to the patterns of human identity that range from humankind as a whole, 
to a variety of subglobal identity patterns ranging from large to small, but not dependent on 
states for their reproduction. Almost by definition there cannot be any organised actors (aka 
secondary institutions) within this meaning. In the case of political world society, the situation is 
reversed. This meaning focuses mainly on secondary institutions, raising the question of what 
primary institution(s) constitute these actors and determine their legitimate behaviour.
5
 
 
 Normative world society 
Primary institutions in normative world society necessarily centre on the legitimacy, or not, of 
groups of human beings being referent objects in the sense that their particular shared identity 
has a right to be recognised and respected by others. Entities that take organised form and have 
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actor quality are by definition ruled out of normative world society, so whatever the primary 
institutions are, they are not about constituting such actors and defining their legitimate 
behaviour. They can only be about establishing the normative legitimacy of claims to group or 
collective identity. We might therefore identify the key primary institution of normative world 
society as collective identity.
6
 
 
Looking through that lens, it is clear that some kinds of claim to collective identity already have 
established, even privileged, positions within interstate society. As already noted, the very large 
and widespread discussion of human rights generally starts from assumptions about a collective 
identity as the ‘great society of humankind’. Although the more political aspects of human rights 
remain hotly contested between authoritarian and democratic governments and societies, there is 
a consensual substrate around the survival and development interpretations of this concept. 
Humankind thus has established, and powerful, if still thin and partly contested, standing as a 
legitimate collective identity. A strong case can also be made that religion is widely accepted as 
a legitimate claim to collective identity, and that religious communities have a right to exist and 
to preserve and reproduce themselves. Such claims are made, and widely accepted, on behalf of 
Muslims, Jews, Buddhists, Christians, Hindus, and others, and there is a long tradition going 
back to the beginning of civilization of religion being legitimately differentiated from politics 
(even though also sometimes combined with it in the form of god-kings). The fact that there are 
endless disputes between and within religions, and that some states have campaigned against 
religion (the Soviet Union in its heyday, China against the Falun Gong), does not invalidate the 
general standing of religion as a legitimate claim to collective identity. Civilization is also used 
as a claim of collective identity, but perhaps has less standing than religion. Civilizational claims 
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somewhat overlap with religious ones, and in the case of countries such as China and India that 
claim to represent civilizations, also overlap with the interstate domain. Huntington’s (1996) 
Clash of Civilizations, notoriously presented civilizations almost as actors (see Katzenstein, 2010 
for a critique). 
 
Interestingly, and provocatively, nationalism of course also fits as a form of collective identity. 
The ES long ago established nationalism as a primary institution of interstate society (Mayall, 
1990; Buzan, 2014: 109-12, 157), associating it powerfully with the state level. This association 
gives nationalism perhaps the most privileged claim to recognition as a legitimate collective 
identity, making it a leading example of the transmission of ideas from normative world society 
into the primary institutions of interstate society. But as many have observed, nationalism as an 
identity is a poor fit with the pattern of territorial states. While there are only 200 or so states, 
there are several thousand nations. Some of these are buried within states, and some span across 
more than one state. Problems of irredentism and secession are legion, with some states playing 
to their multinational realities (e.g. Canada) and others trying to homogenize their citizens (e.g. 
France, China). Although states have certainly played a key role in creating and promoting 
nations as a form of political awareness, it is far from clear that either the creation or 
reproduction of national identity in a wider sense depends on states.  
 
A wide variety of other collective identities are also out there within normative world society. 
Some of these are relatively uncontroversial, and easily support non-state actors within political 
world society. Think, for example, of collective identities linked to sport, professions, and 
various aspects of popular culture. Some are more controversial, such as revolutionary 
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movements or political dissidents of one sort or another. These might garner a mix of opposition 
and support regarding their legitimacy. And some will be seen as largely beyond the pale, with 
claims for legitimacy mostly opposed. Think of paedophiles, extreme religious cults, terrorists 
and suchlike.  
 
If the idea of collective identity as the primary institution for normative world society is 
accepted, then an interesting empirical research agenda opens up to map the identity structure of 
normative world society and assess what kinds of identities get political recognition, what do not, 
and why. 
 
 Political world society 
The most obvious institutions in political world society are the many and varied non-state actors 
– secondary institutions – that make it their business to intermediate between normative world 
society and interstate society through social movement activism. The interests of these actors 
range across a wide spectrum: peace, humanitarianism, human rights, religion, science, sport, 
commerce, labour rights, environmentalism, etc. The main activity of these non-state actors is, in 
one form or another, advocacy within interstate society, often through their participation in 
International Governmental Organizations (IGOs) and conferences, and also by direct activism. 
They also provide services, either by themselves or as contractors to states or IGOs. There is no 
sharp division of labour here, and many non-state actors (think of religious and humanitarian 
groups) play as both lobbyists and service providers. Such activity can be tracked back to the late 
18
th
 and early 19
th
 century. Anti-slavery organizations lobbied at the Congress of Vienna in 
1815, and peace activists were present at The Hague Conferences in the late 19
th
 century. 
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Organized social movement activism rode on the back of the rise of nationalism and popular 
sovereignty during the 19
th
 century, which legitimised public opinion as part of political 
discourse and negotiation. International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) proliferated 
alongside and in interaction with the rise of IGOs during the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries, rising from a 
few hundred before the First World War, to 25,000 today (Willetts, 1996; Mazower, 2012; 
Davies, 2013; Buzan and Lawson, 2015: 89-91, 93-5). 
 
Under the definitions I am using here, the actors in a society must be constituted by, and have 
their legitimate behaviour shaped by, primary institutions. From the Congress of Vienna in 1815 
to the Paris Conference on Climate Change in 2015, the participation of non-state actors in IGOs 
and conferences has had to be allowed by states. The obvious principle that explains such 
permission is the rise of organised advocacy as a legitimate expression of public opinion. This 
occurred first within the domestic politics of the more democratic modern states, and spread 
from there into multilateral diplomacy. Advocacy is therefore the main primary institution of 
political world society. This remains broadly true despite sharp differences on advocacy within 
states. Russia, China and other authoritarian states often make life difficult for non-state actors 
within their domestic jurisdictions, either banning them or classifying them as foreign agents. 
But this does not affect the now deeply institutionalised position of INGOs in world politics. 
Advocacy of course does not cover the service providing side of non-state actors, but that is 
largely covered by two institutions of interstate society – international law and the market – that 
authorise and legitimise a degree of independence to non-state actors. 
 
The Interplay Between the Institutional Structures of International and World Society 
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The third meaning of world society (integrated) requires that one see the interhuman, 
transnational and interstate societies merged in some fairly profound way. It therefore moves 
away from the issue of what institutions world society might have in itself, and towards analysis 
of the integration and interplay of institutions across all three domains. One can see this in terms 
of a spectrum of gradations of interplay from minimal to maximal:  
 Minimal interplay would be top-down only, where the institutions at the interstate level 
are dominant, and play down into world society. 
 Low interplay would be the kind of two-way street described by Wheeler (2000), Clark 
(2007) and Pella (2013) in which world society sometimes influences the values of 
interstate society. 
 Moderate interplay would be along the lines of global governance, where states and non-
state actors play alongside each other in significant ways (Bukovansky et al., 2012), as in 
the Ebola crisis of 2014-15. 
 Maximal interplay would be found in an integrated world society based on acknowledged 
and legitimate functional differentiation amongst different types of units. 
 
Thinking along these lines suggests that in an integrated world society, the three domains would 
be bound together in three distinct ways: 
 Primary institutions from the interstate domain penetrating into the transnational/political 
and interhuman/normative domains. 
 Primary institutions from normative and political world society penetrating into the 
interstate domain. And 
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 Additional primary institutions needed to establish the rights and responsibilities of the 
different types of unit in relation to both other units of their own type, and other units of 
different types. 
The first two of these are already fairly easy to see in the contemporary practices of global 
international society, where interplay among the domains can be found at minimal, low and 
moderate levels (see Davies 2017 for elaboration). The last as yet has no empirical reality 
because the interstate level remains the dominant one. 
 
Interstate institutions in the transnational and interhuman  
domains 
 
It is pretty obvious that some of the primary institutions of interstate society penetrate deeply 
into the transnational/political and interhuman/normative domains. Perhaps the most obvious 
example of this is nationalism, already discussed above, which resonates powerfully between 
normative world society and interstate society. This has been a two-way street, with states 
promoting nationalism downward, and world society promoting it upward. Nationalism, like 
football, has almost everywhere been deeply internalised and naturalised. Just as almost nobody 
remembers that football is an English game, almost nobody thinks of nationalism as a French 
idea. There are certainly disputes about which nationalism should define various peoples, but 
little dispute about the principle itself. Similar, if less dramatic, cases could be made about 
several other interstate institutions. The ideas of sovereignty and territoriality are pretty widely 
and deeply embedded in the public mind, and accepted as legitimising the organization of 
political life within states. So also are the values of human equality and development. 
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Increasingly environmental stewardship, despite many ongoing breaches in practice, is also 
accepted across the three domains (Falkner and Buzan, 2017). The right to war under specified 
conditions (e.g. self-defence), and not others (e.g. imperialism), also probably has wide popular 
support. Human rights and democracy are contested, and do not count as fully fledged 
institutions of global international society, but they nevertheless have considerable force in the 
interhuman and transnational domains in many populations. Most of these institutions are widely 
and popularly supported as matters of belief almost everywhere.  
 
The market and international law probably have less resonance in the interhuman/normative 
world society, but are hugely important to the transnational/political world society because they 
legitimise and support the non-state organizational forms and activities within that domain. 
Whereas most of the institutions just discussed are held in place mainly by belief, the market 
almost certainly has a more mixed profile, being held in place partly by belief, partly by 
calculation, and partly by coercion, and with complex possibilities for the distribution of support 
and opposition between and among people and elites. 
 
Some of the other institutions of interstate society are mainly of interest to state elites, and only 
occasionally resonate strongly into world society. This might be said of diplomacy, great power 
management, the balance of power, and war. There are times when peace movements and 
organizations mobilise around these institutions, for example in the peace movement of the 
interwar years that opposed secret diplomacy and ‘the merchants of death’, and the various anti-
nuclear movements that accompanied the Cold War. But these more technical institutions 
generally don’t play strongly into the identity and organizational rights of world society. 
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Normative and political institutions in the interstate domain 
 
Looking at the other side of the street, it is clear that there is also significant traffic going 
towards interstate society. Some collective identities, most obviously nationalism and religion, 
but also in significant ways humankind as a whole, have substantial legitimacy as the basis for 
making claims in the proceedings of interstate society. Think, for example, of the Kurds, the 
Tibetans and the Palestinians; or of Russia’s claims concerning ethnic Russians living in 
neighbouring countries; or of organizations such as the Islamic Conference, the Arab League and 
the Nordic Union. Think also of the interstate machinery around human equality and human 
rights, which, since the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) are now 
embodied not only in the Charter of the UN (Clark 2007: 131-51), but also in many UN 
Conventions and Committees, and in many regional bodies. The UN has a Human Rights 
Council, and there is a body of international humanitarian law. Nationalism, indeed, now 
arguably stands alongside sovereignty and territoriality as one of the key primary institutions that 
defines the modern state. 
 
The key primary institution from transnational/political world society, advocacy, has not been 
recognized under this label, but actual practice makes it abundantly clear that it is widely and 
deeply accepted in interstate society. For two centuries states have welcomed, or at least allowed, 
non-state actors to participate in many of their diplomatic activities. From the Congress of 
Vienna, through The Hague Conferences and the League of Nations, to the UN system and the 
many specialised IGOs and international conferences, many INGOs and firms are now deeply 
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and formally embedded in the processes of multilateral diplomacy. They are still there only by 
permission, making this fall well short of an integrated world society. But they are now firmly 
part of the process, and play an important role in both strengthening its legitimacy and providing 
expertise. It is on this basis that the term ‘global governance’ takes on real meaning. When one 
thinks, for example, about environmental stewardship, it embodies a mix of state and non-state 
entities and activities: not just the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), but also the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the International Union for Conservation of 
Nature (IUCN), the 1972 Stockholm Conference, the Rio summit of 1992, conferences in 
Copenhagen (2009) and Paris (2015), Greenpeace, and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), 
among others. 
 
 Integrative institutions across the domains 
 
There is no empirical referent for an integrated world society, so we enter the realm of 
speculation. At the moment, the claims of global governance enthusiast notwithstanding, we are 
still in a world in which interstate society claims, and to a considerable degree exercises, political 
primacy in the world order. Non-state actors and identity groups can play in this game, but only 
by permission, and under rules largely set by states. 
 
Recall the definition given above Buzan (2004: 203) of an integrated world society. It:  
would be based on principles of functional differentiation amongst the various types of 
entities in play, and agreements about the rights and responsibilities of different types of 
unit in relation both to each other and to different types. States and firms, for example, 
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would have to accept the historical evidence that neither performs efficiently when it tries 
to do the other’s job, and that their respective legal rights and obligations need to be 
clearly demarcated. Each type of unit would be acknowledged by the others as holding 
legal and political status independently, not as a gift from either of the others. Individuals 
and firms would thus become subjects of international law in their own right. 
An integrated world society would therefore have to give standing to different types of actor – 
individuals, firms, INGOs – in their own right, and not just by the recognition of states. That 
would require a substantial redefinition of sovereignty, and a move towards some form of 
neomedieval order in which different types of units played alongside each other with none in the 
dominant position (Bull, 1977: 254-5). Almost certainly such an order would be strongly 
influenced by functional differentiation because it would have to be based on the allocation of 
different rights and responsibilities to the types of actors in play. There is not much point in 
trying to envisage the details of this here. What can be said is that whatever principles of 
differentiation and legitimacy were agreed amongst the different types of actor would almost 
certainly become primary institutions of an integrated world society. 
 
Conclusions 
 
I set out these two lines of argument in the full knowledge that they are preliminary, and likely to 
be hotly contested. Their main purpose is to provoke debate. World society is still an unclear and 
vague concept within ES theory. Yet it occupies an important place, and there is enough 
literature on it to tease out a range of implicit and explicit meanings, and to explore some of their 
consequences. By making these meanings and consequences clear I hope at least to encourage 
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some clarification of terminology in the debates, and to open up some interesting lines of 
research. Exposure in this way might also force some decisions about whether to carry on with 
the range of meanings shown here, or try to tighten up the concept in some other way. My own 
feeling about it at this point is that both differentiating usage among normative, political and 
integrative world society, and identifying the institutional structures beyond interstate society, 
clarify the debate and provide a good framing for sharpening up the place of world society in ES 
theory. 
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1 I am grateful to Ian Clark, Thomas Linsenmaier, John Pella, Laust Schouenborg and 
John Williams, for comments on an earlier draft of this paper. 
2 I am grateful to John Williams for this point. 
3 Distinguishing non-state actors from states is not straightforward. Many non-state 
actors depend on the legal and political framework provided by states even if they are 
substantially autonomous as actors (e.g. Amnesty International). But some apparently 
non-state actors are closely tied to states by finance or ideology (e.g. peace groups in 
the Soviet Union). 
4 Primary institutions originally evolve in some place and time. After that, they can be 
imposed upon, or adopted by, others, as was the case with sovereignty, nationalism 
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and territoriality during the expansion of Western international society to global scale. I 
am grateful to Mutsumi Hirano for this point. 
5 Under this logic, states are also a type of secondary institution, but are differentiated 
from non-state actors because of their claim to political primacy over both people and 
other forms of organization. For discussion see Buzan (2004: 90-97, 118-28). 
6 A precondition for this is that there has to be in place an epistemological infrastructure 
that makes normative theorising possible. For collective indentity to work as a primary 
institution, it is essential that the validity and political salience of ethics and associated 
normative projects for achieving ethically valid change are accepted as valid modes of 
intellectual activity and bases for political engagement. I am grateful to John Williams for 
this point. 
